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TAKING A BYTE OUT OF ABUSIVE
AGENCY DISCRETION: A
PROPOSAL FOR DISCLOSURE IN
THE USE OF COMPUTER MODELS
During the past decade, federal administrative agencies and
parties appearing before regulatory bodies have used computer-
generated simulations, such as econometric models, with increas-
ing frequency to formulate or attack policies. The use of well-
documented models simplifies review procedures for the public,
administrative agencies, and courts. The public can examine the
assumptions and information that administrators used in mak-
ing their decisions without having to probe the administrators'
minds. Administrative agencies can review the logic behind the
conclusions of parties appearing before them without costly and
complex cross-examination or discovery proceedings. When the
assumptions, methodology, and data used to construct models
become part of the administrative record, courts can identify ar-
bitrary and capricious agency actions with greater accuracy.
Problems arise, however, when agencies or parties appearing
before agencies do not document their models adequately. Be-
cause some of the larger models such as the Data Resources
model of the United States economy or the Wharton
Econometric Forecasting Model use as many as sixteen hundred
mathematical equations,1 the assumptions and statistical tech-
niques which provide such a tremendous opportunity for review
can get lost in a mass of numbers. The public, agencies, and
courts all gain from an explicit statement of the assumptions
and data problems in these models. Stating the assumptions and
making the models available for scrutiny not only helps those
who object to an agency's decision review the underlying reason-
ing; it also forces those who create the models to examine the
accuracy of their assumptions because they know critics will
have the opportunity to review their decisions.
1. Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1983, at 1, 20, col. 6 (Wharton econometric model, 1600 equa-
tions; Data Resources model, 800 equations).
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Currently, there are no comprehensive requirements detailing
what information agencies must release when they make deci-
sions based upon computer-generated simulations. Few agencies
publish guidelines for parties seeking to introduce findings from
computer models into administrative hearings.2 The disclosure
of this information would improve the policy process by provid-
ing decisionmakers and their critics with greater insight into the
other party's conclusions. In the case of government-generated
data, some explanation may be legally required.3 This documen-
tation should include the assumptions behind the model, the ra-
tionale or methodology used to construct the model, and the
source and potential bias of the data.
This Note examines the need for comprehensive requirements
for the release of information pertaining to the use of computer-
generated simulations used by federal administrative agencies or
parties appearing before regulatory bodies. Part I of this Note
defines computer models, identifies some of their current uses in
administrative proceedings, and describes the advantages of
these models. Part II reviews the current requirements for docu-
mentation of computer models and the judicial review standards
for agency findings. Part III examines the potential problems in
the use of models and discusses the need for more adequate dis-
closure. Part IV describes several tests for verifying the accuracy
of models. This Part concludes by suggesting documentation re-
quirements to ensure the most beneficial use of computer mod-
els in administrative proceedings.
I. CURRENT USES OF COMPUTER MODELS
A. Definition
A computer model is usually a simplified image of reality
based upon mathematical equations.4 Computer models take
many forms. The simplest models, such as the popular, commer-
cial, electronic spreadsheet Lotus, allow users to make calcula-
tions faster and more accurately than they could by hand. Fi-
2. Only the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Patent and Trademark
Office, and the Postal Service have adopted formal guidelines for the review of computer
models. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.363 (1985) (FCC); 37 C.F.R. § 301.51(i)(2) (1985) (Patent and
Trademark Office); 39 C.F.R. § 3000.31(k)(2)(ii)-(3)(i) (1985) (Postal Rate Commission).
3. See infra notes 20, 58 and accompanying text.
4. For a more comprehensive definition of computer models, see D. MEADOWS & J.
ROBINSON, THE ELECTRONIC ORACLE 5-7 (1985); D. MEADOWS, J. RICHARDSON, & G.
BRUCKMANN, GROPING IN THE DARK 7 (1982).
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nancial analysts use them for bookkeeping and budget
allocation, as well as for simpler calculations such as determin-
ing finance charges on home purchases.
More complicated models produce results that, because of the
tedious or complex interactive nature of the models, preclude
hand calculations. Models can handle complex calculations in an
efficient manner. For example, it would take a prohibitively long
time for most policymakers to make hand calculations of the ef-
fect of an increase in sulfur dioxide emissions from a specific
power plant over a 10, 20, or 100 year time frame. Even given
infinite time, hand calculations of changes in models with two or
more related variables will not produce accurate results because
only a computer has the sophistication and power to capture the
interactive relationship among the different variables. For in-
stance, hand calculations could not capture the effect that a
switch to low-sulfur coal and the installation of antipollution de-
vices at a power plant would have on air pollution levels because
the antipollution devices would work less effectively on low-sul-
fur coal. This lack of opportunity for independent verification
necessitates an understanding of the assumptions and statistical
inferences used to create models. The only realistic chance for
review comes before, not after, the model produces its results.
Only by scrutinizing the input can the agency, the public, or a
reviewing court place faith in the model's output.
Administrative agencies and parties appearing before regula-
tory bodies typically use one of three classes of models for fore-
casting or policy analysis. The first, autoregressive models, a
form of time-series forecasting, presumes no knowledge of the
causal relationships that affect the variables. The modeler sim-
ply extrapolates from past trends to make predictions. Agencies
can use these models in rate hearings to predict future train us-
age from past load figures, or in road building decisions to pro-
ject increases in automobile traffic from past vehicle usage.
Time-series modeling assumes that all of the factors measured
must remain constant during the period studied for the model to
produce consistent results. In the rate hearing example, past use
will not predict future loads accurately if a competitor estab-
lished a more economical transportation system in the interim.
Failure to acknowledge this assumption and other limitations of
the model yields incorrect conclusions.
Models of the second type, those employing single-equation
simulations, represent a relationship with a single function of
explanatory variables. In many cases, these models are too sim-
ple for agency needs. Nevertheless, an examination of their tech-
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niques simplifies the understanding of more complex
econometric models. Single-equation models can represent both
linear and nonlinear functions, but linear models are more com-
mon. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
may wish to measure the effect of auto emissions on the general
air pollution level. Agency modelers would express this relation-
ship with the general mathematical formula of
pt= a + f#xt
where "4'" represents the dependent variable of air pollution,
"a" represents the intercept where the regression line crosses
the "Y" axis, "0" represents the slope of the line, and "XL" rep-
resents the independent variable of auto emissions.5 The mod-
eler could express this relationship in the following equation:
air pollution level due to auto emissions =
general air pollution level + increase in air pollution
caused by auto emissions
If the intercept were five, and each additional unit of auto emis-
sions caused a ten percent increase in the air pollution level, the
modeler could represent the regression line mathematically as:
41t =5 + 1/lOx
The level of air pollution will therefore rise with the level of
auto pollution. Even this oversimplified example illustrates po-
tential errors. The model assumes that the general air pollution
level will be five without auto pollution. The EPA could not
have determined this figure by observation because the Agency
could not eliminate all emissions from the environment in order
to make this measurement. Only an analysis of the calculations
5. The dependent variable is the variable the modeler wishes to alter. The modeler
will manipulate an independent variable to gain a better understanding of the dependent
variable's behavior. The intercept is the point in a linear relationship where the line
representing the equation crosses either the "X" or "Y" axis and is the point where
either the "X" or the "Y" variable does not affect the other variable. In the text exam-
ple, the intercept is five, which means that if there are no auto emissions, there will still
be five units of air pollution present. The slope of the line explains how much the inde-
pendent variable affects the dependent variable. In the example in the text, a slope of
"1/10" means that an increase of one unit in auto emissions will cause the general air
pollution level to rise 1/10 unit.
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used to determine the number will assure a fair critique of the
model.
The methodology or rationale behind the model also deserves
close scrutiny. The entire model assumes that an increase in
auto emissions will increase the general air pollution level. Al-
though this appears obvious intuitively, not all intuitive predic-
tions have a basis in reality.6 Some of the substances found in
auto exhaust might work as a catalyst to reduce the general level
of air pollution, rather than increase it. Finally, the data would
deserve review. The EPA might not have used valid tests to
measure the emissions level or its sampling may have biased the
distribution of the data. For example, the Agency might obtain
invalid overall readings because it measured exhaust levels in
the most polluted areas, the least polluted, only from old cars,
solely from new cars, etc. In order to assess the accuracy of the
Agency's findings, the public must know the assumptions, meth-
odology, and sources of data used to construct the model.
Most relationships, however, are not as easy to express as this
simple air pollution model because imperfect data will often
cause a degree of "scatter" around the line.7 The line
4t = ~a+ i5xt+ Et
where "E," represents random influences on the dependent varia-
ble, known as "scatter," shows a more realistic relationship. In
this example, the ",E" could affect the level of air pollution as
well. In constant weather conditions, the level of air pollution
should rise with an increase in automobile emissions. Wind or
rain might disperse the pollution, however, and unless the mod-
eler accounts for this factor, the model may predict that higher
automobile emissions would reduce overall pollution.
These single-equation models eliminate the extraneous factors
by determining how the independent variable affects the de-
pendent variable. The modeler isolates the independent variable
by performing a "least squares regression," which minimizes the
sum of the squared deviations, or distance, between the actual
and the predicted independent variable values.
6. See infra note 30.
7. "Scatter" is the distribution of the data around the expected or predicted line. A
line drawn through two points will not have any scatter, but a line drawn through a field
of ten points probably will. The scatter represents the distance from the line to those
points not on the line. The farther the points are from the line, the less accurately the
line will represent the relationship.
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Most administrative agencies use the third type of model,
often referred to as multivariate regression or econometric anal-
ysis.' These regression models estimate the effects of changes in
economic, environmental, or other societal conditions based
upon the alteration of one or more factors by government regu-
lators. These models have two or more independent variables in
addition to the constant term. The models assume that the de-
pendent variable "4,," is a linear function of a series of indepen-
dent variables x,, X2, . • • Xk and an error term, "s." Modelers
could represent multiple regression models with the following
equation:
4t # 1 "L - f 2X2t +L 3Xt + # kXkt + EL
The coefficients, O2, 02, •3 . . .k, each measure a change in Y
from the associated X term. Depending on the form of the
model, the X terms may also be related to each other. Because
the complex interrelationships develop simultaneously, the
terms can alter the dependent variable quickly and in a drastic
manner. Although these models provide a more accurate repre-
sentation of reality because of the quantification of these inter-
relationships, their complexity precludes verification through
hand calculations. Model verification thus focuses on an exami-
nation of the construction and operation of the model, rather
than on its results.
All three classes of models provide an imperfect but useful
quantification of social and physical systems. For administra-
tors, these models offer a glimpse of reality through numbers to
predict the future behavior of these systems. The danger of
these models lies in accepting their conclusions without examin-
ing their underlying assumptions.
8. Regression can become very complicated for those unfamiliar with the jargon. One
of the leading texts in this area is R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS
AND ECONOMETRIC FORECASTS (2d ed. 1981). A slightly older work explains these models
to the uninitiated in a clearer manner. Intriligator, Econometrics and Economic Fore-
casting, in ECONOMICS OF ENGINEERING AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS 157 (J. English ed. 1972).
For a clear, concise description of some of the limitations of econometric models, see D.
MEADOWS & J. ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 51-54.
Several recent articles provide the clearest explanations for lawyers. See Fisher, Multi-
ple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 702 (1980); Rubinfeld & Steiner,
Quantitative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983,
at 69; see also Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1442 (1973).
For discussions of regression models in administrative proceedings, see M. FINKEL-
STEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 211-48 (1978); Case, Problems in Judicial Review
Arising from the Use of Computer Models and Other Quantitative Methodologies in
Environmental Decisionmaking, 10 B.C. ENVTL. L. REv. 251 (1982).
[VOL. 19:3
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B. Present Uses of Multivariate Regression Models
Administrative agencies have used multivariate regression
models for years. Regression techniques gained prominence in
the legal community in 1976 when the Solicitor General relied
on them in several cases before the Supreme Court to show the
deterrent effects of the death penalty upon murder. Lawyers
have also used regression analysis extensively in civil rights
cases 0 and busing cases. 1 Examples of use of the method in ad-
ministrative proceedings include modeling by parties involved in
the AT & T divestiture case,' 2 by the Department of Health and
Human Services to set Medicare premium rates,"3 by the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration to predict injuries in airplane
crashes, 4 by the Department of Energy in rate hearings, 1 by the
Federal Communications Commission in television franchise li-
censing proceedings,' 6 by the EPA in air pollution control,' 7 and
by the Department of Agriculture in deciding marketing agree-
ments.'8 Private industry groups have also used models for pur-
poses such as suggesting that the federal government devote
more of its food stamp program to encouraging egg
consumption."'
Sierra Club v. Costle2 0 demonstrates the benefits of full dis-
9. See, e.g., Fowler v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 904 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated,
459 U.S. 809 (1982).
11. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
12. See, e.g., Investigations of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs; MTS and
WATS Market Structure, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,418 (1984).
13. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Monthly Actuarial Rates and Monthly Premium
Rates, 49 Fed. Reg. 38,510 (1984).
14. See, e.g., Draft Advisory Circular on Human Exposure to Impact and a Preview
of the Agency's Crash Dynamics Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,111, 37,114 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Proposed Wholesale Power Rate Adjustment: Public Hearings and Op-
portunities for Public Review and Comment (Bonneville Power Administration, DOE),
49 Fed. Reg. 35,177 (1984).
16. See, e.g., Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertain-
ment Requirements and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations,
49 Fed. Reg. 33,588 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Battery Manufacturing Point Source Category; Effluent Limitations
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards and New Source Performance Standards, 49 Fed.
Reg. 9108 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Navel Oranges Grown in Arizona and Designated Part of California;
Valencia Oranges Grown in Arizona and Designated Part of California; Decision on Pro-
posed Further Amendment of Marketing Agreements and Orders 907 and 908, Both as
Amended, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,071 (1984).
19. See, e.g., Food Stamp Program: Thrifty Food Plan, 49 Fed. Reg. 39,879 (1984).
20. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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closure of a model's assumptions and methodology. In Sierra
Club, the group challenged the EPA's standards governing emis-
sions from coal-burning power plants. The plaintiffs argued that
the proposed government standards would allow these plants to
produce too much pollution. The EPA had promulgated these
standards with the help of an econometric model. This model
represented the affected parts of the country with a series of
mathematical equations, used data from present conditions, and
then estimated the effects of the new regulations. By testing al-
ternative pollution control scenarios based upon possible future
levels of pollution, the model predicted the effect of different
emission amounts on pollution levels. The D.C. Circuit accepted
the use of the model because the EPA explained the assump-
tions behind the model, the procedures used in constructing it,
and the limitations of the Agency's conclusions. 1
In this case, full disclosure helped all of the parties. Although
the Sierra Club lost the case, it did have the opportunity to ex-
amine the EPA's equations and it convinced the EPA to make
technical changes in the model. 22 The court had a more complete
record on which to base its holding. Finally, although the EPA
had to acknowledge errors in its modeling, it gained from having
the Sierra Club and the court review its conclusions. It produced
a solution based upon credible analysis. If the Agency had not
disclosed the model's assumptions and limitations, some of its
21. The court noted:
In this case, the utility model itself and its key assumptions were discussed in
the proposed rule and background documents. EPA invited public comments on
the model and its assumptions, with the agency recognizing the sensitivity of the
model to a "few key initial assumptions." The joint interagency working group
reviewed the results of model runs, revised assumptions, and required new runs
of the model when it was deemed appropriate. The principal comments received
by EPA on the model and the initial assumptions were discussed, together with
the results of the three phases of the modeling and the major post-proposal
changes to the model, in the preamble to the final [regulations]. In reviewing
this record on the use of the econometric model we have carefully examined,
within the limits of our competence, EPA's explanation for the model's prem-
ises, the results, and the conclusions drawn therefrom to test them for internal
consistency and reasonableness. Although the EPA has the benefit of the pre-
sumption of good faith and regularity in agency action, we have attempted to
ascertain whether the results have been improperly skewed by the modeling for-
mat. We conclude that EPA's reliance on its model did not exceed the bounds of
its usefulness and that its conduct of the modeling exercise was proper in all
respects. We are in fact reassured by EPA's own consciousness of the limits of
its model, and its invitation and response to public comment on all aspects of
the model.
Id. at 333-34 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 335.
[VOL. 19:3
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counterintuitive conclusions23 might not have withstood a court
review.
Significantly, the Sierra Club brought this action under the
Clean Air Act, 24 a "hybrid" rulemaking statute that imposes ad-
ditional procedural requirements beyond those found in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA).2 The Clean Air Act requires
the Agency, in promulgating rules, to include in its statement of
basis and purpose "the factual data on which the proposed rule
is based ' 26 and "the methodology used in obtaining the data and
in analyzing the data. '27 In a case where the government relied
upon a computer model in a rulemaking procedure not governed
by a "hybrid" statute, there would have been no requirement for
disclosure of the methodology or data used in the decision.2" The
absence of disclosure would have hampered review by both the
public and the court.
C. Advantages of Computer Models
Models, such as the econometric model employed in Sierra
Club, allow administrators to make predictions that would oth-
erwise entail great cost-such as the effects of an airplane crash
23. For an example of a counterintuitive administrative finding, see infra note 30 and
accompanying text.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982). "Hybrid" rulemaking statutes impose more
stringent requirements than those found in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Each statute specifies different procedural requirements relevant to the use of computer
models. These statutes include: Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982) (public
hearing, if requested, to include cross-examination on disputed issues of material fact,
substantial evidence review); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056, 2060
(1982) (substantial evidence review); Department of Energy Authorization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7191(b)-(d) (1982) (notice of proposed rulemaking to include rule and description of
supporting data, oral presentation of views, data and argument if the rule is likely to
have a substantial impact on the economy, individuals, or businesses, and the final rule
accompanied by a statement responding to "major comments, criticisms, and alternatives
offered" during the comment period); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3)(A)-(B) (1982) (cross-examination and
rebuttal on disputed issues of material fact, substantial evidence review); Medical Device
Amendments (to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act), 21 U.S.C. § 360g(c) (1982)
(substantial evidence review); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655
(1982) (substantial evidence review); Securities Acts Amendments, 15 U.S.C. §
78f(e)(4)(A) (1982) (opportunity for oral presentation of data, views or arguments, cross-
examination and rebuttal on disputed issues of material fact, substantial evidence re-
view); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605, 2618 (1976) (cross-examination
and rebuttal on disputed issues of material fact, substantial evidence review).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3)(A) (1982).
27. Id. § 7607(d)(3)(B).
28. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 19:3
on the human body or the health consequences of inefficient pol-
lution controls. Models allow policymakers to predict events
before they occur. These models also circumvent the bias of the
modelers and therefore sometimes identify counterintuitive
trends.2 9 For example, in Sierra Club the EPA discovered that
tighter controls on coal-burning plants did not always lead to
lower pollution levels; in some cases, the lowest levels resulted
from relaxing the controls.8 0 The computer model allowed the
administrators to reach conclusions that they might have over-
looked had they relied solely on their professional judgment and
past experience.
Computer models also can provide error-free deductions from
the information entered. 1 Modelers specify their understanding
of a real-world system in mathematical form. Consequently,
judges can review an administrative decision based upon a com-
puter model without probing an administrator's mind to find an
explanation for the ruling or adjudication.32 The judge can di-
29. According to one theory, all humans see the world through deep, implicit operat-
ing assumptions. An understanding of the modeler's preconceptions, or paradigms, will
help the lawyer to understand the modeler's biases and how they shape the outcome of
the model. For a theoretical discussion of paradigms, see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). Kuhn notes that "[sicientists work from models
acquired through education and through subsequent exposure to the literature often
without quite knowing or needing to know what characteristics have given these models
the status of community paradigms .... Paradigms may be prior to, more binding, and
more complete than any set of rules ..... Id. at 46.
30.
One finding that has been clearly demonstrated by the two years of analysis is
that lower emission standards on new plants do not necessarily result in lower
national [sulfur dioxide] emissions when total emissions from the entire utility
system are considered. There are two reasons for this finding. First, the lowest
emissions tend to result from strategies that encourage the construction of new
coal capacity. This capacity, almost regardless of the alternative analyzed, will
be less polluting than the existing coal- or oil-fired capacity that it replaces. Sec-
ond, the higher cost of operating the new capacity (due to higher pollution costs)
may cause the newer, cleaner plants to be utilized less than they would be under
a less stringent alternative. These situations are demonstrated by the [computer
models] presented here.
657 F.2d 298, 335 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580, 33,607 (1979)).
31. In most cases, this property will be an advantage in the policy process. But this
property can also harm the modeler. Analysts may assume that the computer will pro-
duce the correct results when in reality the results may be based upon improper inputs.
Without the proper scrutiny of the assumptions, methodology, and data used to con-
struct the model, the logical properties of the computer may hurt the policy process.
32. The court may not "probe the [actual] mental processes" that the administrator
used to make the decision. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). Instead, the
court must look at the information available to the administrator and then base the
review on the standards presented in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). See also infra Part
II of this Note and notes 32-72.
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rectly scrutinize the processes the administrator used to make
the decision.
These advantages are lost, however, if agencies do not disclose
the documentation behind the models. Without the chance to
impeach these models by examining the assumptions, methodol-
ogy, and data used in constructing them, the models' conclusions
resemble hearsay evidence. The models' conclusions have no le-
gal significance because the credibility of the agencies' findings
rests upon the assertion of those not before a reviewing court.
Forcing the public to dissect a mass of seemingly unrelated
numbers and equations stifles the very purposes of the review
provisions. Nor can the public rely on the courts to protect its
rights when the courts have no realistic opportunity to scrutinize
agency methods. The lack of training in quantitative analysis for
judges, some of whom even describe themselves as "technically
illiterate,"33 only compounds the difficulties facing parties that
seek review of computer models used by administrative agencies.
II. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR AGENCY MODELS
Before the shift to a greater emphasis on rulemaking in the
late 1960's and early 1970's,3 ' administrators introduced most
regulations in trial-type proceedings. Challengers examined the
evidence used and the decisionmaking process in much the same
way that they would in a court.
Parties appearing before regulatory groups could challenge in-
accurate models to ensure that the agency had not abused its
discretion. If the agency did not reveal the factual basis of its
decisions, parties could attack the agency's evidence by cross-
examining the administrator, or by introducing counterevidence
in the same way they would in a normal trial.
Today, if the majority of administrative proceedings resem-
bled trials, agencies would not need to formulate additional rules
for the disclosure of the assumptions, methodology, and data
used in the construction of computer models. With the shift to
33. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); see also Bazelon, Coping with Technology
Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
39 & n.10 (1975) (quoting the original four volume set of K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE (1958)); see also H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE
NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AD-
MINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965). See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
6:1, at 448-49 (2d ed. 1978).
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informal rulemaking, however, the public has fewer opportuni-
ties to scrutinize and challenge agency findings. Under the APA,
the agencies need only publish the "terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues in-
volved" 5 in the Federal Register36 and, after receiving com-
ments from "interested persons, ' 7 publish the final regulations
and incorporate within them a "concise general statement of
their basis and purpose."3 8 The federal government has not
promulgated any specific rules governing the use of computer
models, although a few agencies have brief guidelines addressing
what information the public should receive."
Publication of the final rule does not end the rulemaking
process. Interested parties often challenge these rules in court.
Although a particular statute may govern the forum, venue, and
timing of the review,40 section 706 of the APA determines the
scope or standard of review.41 Courts will review the adequacy of
agency disclosure in accordance with these procedural require-
ments. Individual cases can arise under almost any subsection of
this Act, but most attempts to review agency decisions based
upon findings derived from computer models will fall under one
of three provisions. These standards include the "arbitrary and
capricious," procedural deficiency, and substantial evidence
provisions.
A. "Arbitrary and Capricious"
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard provides the easiest
basis for instituting an action against an agency for inadequate
disclosure. Under section 706(2)(A) of the APA, a reviewing
court shall set aside agency findings that are "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' 42 This standard requires that the agency must act with
35. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1982). See generally ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING (1983).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982).
37. Id. § 553(c).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 410ii-6(b) (1982) (requiring that information about Chaco
Culture National Historical Park be available in a computer database, but not specifying
how one gains access to this information).
40. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 35, at 217.
41. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971); Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects, Inc. v. EPA, 643
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consistency43 and that the policy choice be rationally connected
to the factual basis of the decision." The language suggests that
if the agency uses an econometric model, the agency must show
a connection between its decision and the estimates of the
model. In addition, by requiring an explanation of its decision,
courts can ensure that the agency treats similarly-situated par-
ties in an identical manner. As one administrator noted, "[A]
decision that 'cannot be explained' is very likely to be an arbi-
trary decision."'4 5
Although the arbitrary and capricious standard is the easiest
basis for review, it nevertheless imposes a significant burden on
the challenging party. A court will overturn a rule based upon
improper fact-finding only where "there has been a clear error in
judgment . . . . Although this inquiry into the facts is to be
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a nar-
row one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. "46 The technical complexity of most com-
puter-generated simulations only intensifies the difficulties in
meeting this burden. Courts seldom wish to reevaluate an
agency's scientific and technological determinations.47 Judges do
F.2d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding model used by EPA); Cincinnati Gas & Elec.
Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 1978) (overturning the use of an EPA model
because of the arbitrary and capricious assumptions made by the agency).
43. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976);
Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also DeLong, Informal
Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 285-86, 289, 294-
95, 334-35, 341, 347 (1979); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943).
44. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971).
45. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE SECRETARY'S DECISION ON CONCORDE SUPERSONIC
TRANSPORT 7 (1976); see also Bazelon, supra note 33, at 824.
46. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (cita-
tions omitted).
47. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453
(1972):
A court must be reluctant to reverse results supported by such a weight of con-
sidered and carefully articulated expert opinion. Particularly when we consider a
purely factual question within the area of competence of an administrative
agency created by Congress, and when resolution of that question depends on
"engineering and scientific" considerations, we recognize the relevant agency's
technical expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is without
substantial basis in fact.
Id. at 463; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1389
(D.C. Cir. 1985) ("DOE's analysis of a technical engineering study [an econometric model
of energy consumption] is entitled to great deference from judges, who are hardly
equipped to match the expertise of DOE's scientists."); Citizens Against the Refinery's
Effects, Inc. v. EPA, 643 F.2d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1981) ("Analysis of modeling results
required for [air pollution prevention] applications is a highly technical area particularly
within the expertise of the EPA, and thus the agency interpretation should be given
great weight by the court."); see also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp.,
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not like to unravel complex statistical questions.48 In addition,
the agency retains a presumption favoring the validity of its own
regulations.49 Yet scientific and technological questions, perhaps
more than other agency findings, deserve review precisely be-
cause of their complex character. Their complexity masks the
tremendous agency discretion exercised in constructing these
models.
Disclosure of a model's assumptions, methodology, and data
reduces the difficulties in determining whether an agency acted
in a rational manner. Disclosure allows a court to review the
component elements of the decision instead of just the conclu-
sions. If only the agency has access to the relevant information,
the public and the courts cannot act as a check on the agency's
discretion. Consequently, the court retains the responsibility,
even in complex technical cases, to "penetrate to the underlying
decisions of the agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has exer-
cised a reasoned discretion, with reasons that do not deviate
from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent."50
In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. EPA,51 the court used the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard to review an EPA model
that determined the level of pollution permitted for power
plants in Ohio. The modelers made several assumptions in con-
structing the model. These assumptions all relied upon the pol-
lution dissipating under "least" stable wind conditions. Yet the
court found that these assumptions "have no support in data,
568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Though a reviewing court will not match submission
against counter-submission to decide whether the agency was correct in its conclusion on
scientific matters ... , it will consider whether the agency has taken account of all 'rele-
vant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.' ") (quoting Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-416 (1971)); Smithkline Corp.
v. FDA, 587 F.2d 1107, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
48. See, e.g., Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 410 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated, 459 U.S. 809 (1982):
We are no more statisticians than we are physicians, and counsel who expect of
us informed and consistent treatment of such proofs are well advised to proceed
as do those who advance knotty medical problems for resolution. Our innate
capacity in such matters extends to the "inexorable zero" and perhaps, un-
evenly, somewhat beyond ....
49. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965); Smithkline Corp. v. FDA, 587 F.2d 1107,
1118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (according great weight to the discretion of the agency in a disa-
greement of the experts); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1164
(6th Cir. 1978) (holding use of a computer model to determine air pollution levels not
arbitrary or capricious).
50. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); see also Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the
Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511 (1974).
51. 578 F.2d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 1978) (assumption used in an air pollution model "is
not a rational decision and is arbitrary and capricious").
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[have been] repudiated by most modelers and [were] demon-
strated inaccurate by this record. ' 52 The court could make this
determination only because it had access to the "methodology
used in obtaining and analyzing the data" as required under the
"hybrid" rulemaking provisions of the Clean Air Act. 53 Under
most other regulatory regimes, the Agency would not have had
to provide this information. Disclosure was therefore crucial to
overturning the EPA's fact-finding.
B. Procedural Deficiencies
Although judicial review in informal rulemaking now relies al-
most exclusively on the "arbitrary and capricious" standard,54
challengers to administrative rules may also use other sections of
the APA to obtain the review of computer models. Section
706(2)(D) requires a court to overturn a statute where an agency
promulgates a rule without adhering to legally required proce-
dures.55 These procedures include the requirement that the
agency provide a record of its reasoning.56 A court, however, will
remand the proceeding to the agency only where the failure to
follow proper procedures resulted in harm to the individual or
organization.57 While no court has yet clarified this standard of
harm in cases involving computer models, recent cases suggest
that the public has the right to review the assumptions and the
data incorporated into the model. 5 8 Merely reporting the model's
52. Id. at 662.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1982).
54. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982).
56. This requirement of a record includes informal rulemaking as well as formal
rulemaking. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420-21
(1971); see also ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 35, at
141:
Agencies today must anticipate that courts will conduct a "thorough, probing,
in-depth review" of informal rulemaking, and that they will require the agency
to produce an administrative record to support its final rule. The power to re-
quire submission of a "rulemaking record" for judicial review purposes is inher-
ent in the review function. If a reviewing court is not given the reasoning and
factual support needed to demonstrate the rationality of the rule, the court has
no choice-absent a statutory provision for de novo review-but to remand the
matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(footnote omitted).
57. See, e.g., Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 128 (1st Cir. 1976) (suggesting
lack of a computer printout of the agency's model before the hearing did not materially
affect petitioner's presentation of views at the hearing).
58. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1981):
The safety valves in the use of such sophisticated methodology are the require-
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output is not sufficient.59
Admittedly, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council0 decision sharply limited
the ability of courts to require procedures in addition to those
imposed by the APA. Nevertheless, some of the procedural re-
quirements developed by courts in the 1970's apparently sur-
vived the Court's decision in Vermont Yankee.61 Rules must still
be supported by facts in the rulemaking record. 2 Although the
exact standard remains unclear, 3 courts generally agree with
Judge Leventhal's statement in Portland Cement Association v.
Ruckleshaus that "lilt is not consonant with the purpose of a
rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of inad-
equate data, or on data that, critical degree [sic], is known only
to the agency. '6 4 In Portland Cement, the court remanded to
the EPA a decision on the pollution effects from cement plants
because of inadequate disclosure of the test results and proce-
dures used on existing plants. This information had formed the
partial basis for the emission control level adopted. If an agency
does not disclose the data upon which it relied in its construc-
ment of public exposure of the assumptions and data incorporated into the anal-
ysis and the acceptance and consideration of public comment, the admission of
uncertainties where they exist, and the insistence that ultimate responsibility for
the policy decision remains with the agency rather than the computer.
(footnotes omitted); see also American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 567
F.2d 1016, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[T~he Commission is obligated to provide a complete
analytical defense of its model .... ).
59. Washington Trollers Ass'n v. Kreps, 645 F.2d 684, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1981).
60. 435 U.S. 519 (1976).
61. The Supreme Court's broad dicta in Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 546-49, if
taken literally, would eliminate most of the additional procedural requirements for
rulemaking imposed by courts in the 1970's. Commentators, however, reject the premise
that the Supreme Court sought to do this in its narrow holding. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra
note 34, § 6:36, at 609-10: "The Court's broad dictum probably should not be read liter-
ally but was probably intended to be .no broader than the problem before the
Court ... "
62. See 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 34, § 6:13, at 508:
The question of when rules must be supported with facts can be easily answered
in vague terms, but at the most profound level the question is beyond present
understanding and therefore beyond present law. The vague answer, which may
suffice for most practical purposes, is that a rule must be supported with facts
when a statute so requires, when an issue of fact has arisen in the rulemaking
proceeding that needs to be resolved in order to determine the content of the
rule, and when the rule would be arbitrary and capricious unless it is supported
with facts.
63. Id. at 509.
64. 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); see also 1 K.
DAvIs, supra note 34, § 6:13, at 508.
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tion of the computer model, a court may overturn the decision
because of the agency's failure to support its actions by facts.6 5
C. Substantial Evidence
Section 706(2)(E) of the APA provides the final mechanism
for review of computer models used by administrative agencies.
This section requires a court to set aside an agency action "un-
supported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of
an agency hearing provided by statute.""6 In practice, this
standard does not differ substantially from the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard, and thus is not restricted to adjudications
and formal rulemaking.67
A case decided before Vermont Yankee stressed the impor-
tance of the substantial evidence test. The court in Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Federal Power Commission noted that "the rule that
the 'whole record' be considered-both evidence for and
against-means that the procedures must provide some mecha-
nism for interested parties to introduce adverse evidence and
65. Cf. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir.
1977). In that case, the court overturned a Food and Drug Administration ruling where
[interested parties were not informed of the scientific data, or at least of a selec-
tion of such data deemed important by the agency, so that comments could be
addressed to the data...
... [A]ll the scientific research was collected by the agency, and none of it was
disclosed to interested parties as the material upon which the proposed rule
would be fashioned.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615,
643 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rejecting EPA assumption in making prediction of pollution level
where vehicle manufacturers established that the technology was not available to meet
the requirements of the Clean Air Act and the EPA sought to dispute this flawed techno-
logical methodology).
66. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). In American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the association challenged the estimates
of an economic model on the basis that the estimates did not rise to the level of substan-
tial evidence. The court acknowledged that it could review this model under the substan-
tial evidence test, but it did not overturn the agency's findings.
67. The holding in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) essentially settled the question of which test should be applied in judicial review
of informal rulemaking even though the case did not involve informal rulemaking. See
Pedersen, supra note 34, at 47. Subsequent cases have sometimes merged the two
standards. See Associated Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50
(2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.): "[I]n the review of rules of general applicability made after
notice and comment rulemaking, the two criteria [the arbitrary and capricious test and
the substantial evidence test] do tend to converge." See also National Nutritional Foods
Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 705 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concurring); Note,
Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE
L.J. 1750 (1975).
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criticize evidence introduced by others." 8 The court also stated
that "the requirement of facts based on substantial evidence
mandates greater procedural protection than those accorded
under section 553 of the APA." 9 This opinion indicates that a
failure to allow the public to meet and contradict the findings
that agencies made with computer models violates the proce-
dural safeguards found in the APA. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, squarely rejected the premise that courts can apply re-
quirements in addition to those stated in the APA in the 1978
Vermont Yankee decision:
Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in
the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are
generally not free to impose them if the agencies have
not chosen to grant them. This is not to say necessarily
that there are no circumstances which would ever justify
a court in overturning agency action because of a failure
to employ procedures beyond those required by the stat-
ute. But such circumstances, if they exist, are extremely
rare.
70
While the precedential weight of this dicta is open to debate,71
the opinion comes close to stating that the power to institute
procedural safeguards comes only from the agency itself or from
specific statutory authority, and that courts cannot impose these
requirements unilaterally. Because the nature of computer mod-
els almost precludes review of their findings in any way other
than by examining the model's construction, and agencies have
no incentives to require additional procedural safeguards for
their modelers, the public must rely on an extension of present
statutory authority to review these models.
III. POTENTIAL ERRORS IN COMPUTER MODELS
One of the goals of administrative law is to allow the public
and the courts to review the rationale behind agency decisions.
Review of computer models presents special difficulties. Their
estimates may appear straightforward initially because of their
68. 483 F.2d 1238, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis omitted).
69. Id. at 1258 n.70.
70. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 524 (1976).
71. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 6:36, at 608-09.
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quantitative precision, but the complexity of the models often
masks the tremendous amount of discretionary judgment used
in their construction."' To ensure that administrators do not
abuse this discretion, the public and the courts must have the
opportunity to examine these models carefully. Because most of
the advanced computer models produce results that defy inde-
pendent verification because of their complex interactive nature,
scrutiny of the models must focus on their construction, rather
than on their output. Any party, whether a representative of the
public, an agency, or a court, should consider three main ele-
ments of a model to assess the validity of its predictions. Each of
these areas-the model's assumptions, theory, and data-may
affect the model's results.
A. Model Assumptions
The assumptions behind the model determine the accuracy of
its predictions. If the assumptions lack validity, the model can-
not represent reality.73 The failure to include relevant assump-
tions or variables in the model might cause the agency to make
an incorrect policy choice. Without examining the assumptions
behind a model, the public and the courts cannot assess a deci-
sion derived from a computer model.
The court in Sierra Club v. Costle recognized the importance
of examining the assumptions in computer models. It noted that
72. Otto Eckstein, Chairman of Data Resources, a major econometric consulting firm,
noted in 1983 that his company's forecasts were "60% model and 40% judgment." Wall
St. J., Feb. 17, 1983, at 1, 20, col 6.
73. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 708:
Various properties of multiple regression depend on the accuracy of the assump-
tions [and] different properties involving different assumptions. Moreover, the
dependence is cumulative: if the early assumptions are invalid, the properties
associated with the later assumptions are not likely to be present. In situations
where the assumptions may fail, the use of multiple regression analysis is likely
to be inappropriate.
(footnote omitted); cf. American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d
1016, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1977):
These economic models are robed in the elegance of high speed computers, but
they are at base extrapolations from past experience, projections that must un-
dergo continual examination and revision. They do not always have the reassur-
ing concreteness of empirical observations, but they are the best we have to work
with in casting our programs. Provided that the assumptions on which a model
is based are adequately explained and justified, we see no reason why this type
of evidence may not be used ....
See also Houston, Why Models Go Wrong, BYTE, Oct. 1985, at 151: "Most of the logical
pitfalls of modeling are much older than computers, but computers enable us to misuse
models at superhuman speed and to produce enormous volumes of invalid output."
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"Itihe results [of the computer model] ultimately are shaped by
the assumptions adopted at the outset, and can change drasti-
cally for a given range of input data if key assumptions are ad-
justed even slightly."' 74 Indeed, even small errors in the underly-
ing assumptions can cause gross errors in the predictions that
flow from the model. 75
One potential error involving assumptions is the failure to in-
clude relevant variables. For example, in Southern Louisiana
Area Rate Cases v. Federal Power Commission,7 the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected a computer model used to estimate the number of
natural gas wells drilled. The model only measured the relation-
ship between the number of new wells drilled and the cost of the
gas; it neglected the cost of drilling the wells. The model pre-
dicted that a two cent ceiling on the price of gas would cause
energy companies to drill more exploratory wells in one year
than the total number of wells that had been drilled since
1940.77 This absurd result illustrates the potential for error when
the modeler neglects a key variable. In this example, drilling
costs had a direct bearing on the predictions of future drilling,
but the model neglected this relationship. Because this case was
not governed by a "hybrid" rulemaking statute, 8 the Federal
Power Commission did not have to disclose the documentation
behind its study. An initial review of this model could have pre-
vented this case from reaching the court of appeals before any-
one recognized the egregious errors in the model's assumptions.
The assumptions behind the representation of variables can
also disrupt models. Many concepts defy quantification, so mod-
elers will define them by a substitute or proxy. The modeler may
equate literacy with modernization, or the number of television
sets purchased with how much each individual household
watches television. While the modeling process requires these es-
timations, the desire for quantification of essentially unquantifi-
able ideas may force the modeler to overlook key factors. This
tendency to deny a model's complexity for the sake of mathe-
matical efficiency is especially problematic in law where the is-
sues frequently defy quantification.7 9
74. 657 F.2d at 332.
75. Id.
76. 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
77. 428 F.2d at 436 n.91.
78. See supra note 25.
79. See generally M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, at 11:
A mathematical model cannot reflect all elements of reality and need not do so
to produce usable estimates. However, modeling involves drastic simplifications,
and care is needed to avoid conclusions that are wide of the mark. In particular,
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Modelers may also make assumptions about causality. Be-
cause of the interdependent nature of variables in simultaneous
equation models, assumptions about causality can bias the
model's prediction. Causality appears straightforward, but it can
baffle even the most learned modelers.80 If the model assumes
that X causes Y, parties challenging the validity of the model
should consider that Y may really cause X or that a third factor
may cause both X and Y.81 Only a review of these assumptions
will ensure that the agency did not abuse its discretion and that
it made its decisions in a fair and reasonable manner.
B. Model Theory
The proper use of an econometric model presupposes an un-
derlying theory. The agency should use the model to prove or
disprove its theory, rather than to create the theory. Indeed, a
model's theory is its most important independent variable. A
frequent error of modelers who use prepackaged statistical pro-
grams but do not understand the theory behind modeling comes
from the failure to specify the most important independent vari-
able in advance of running the model.82
there is a tendency-which must be scrutinized in each case-to sweep away
complexity to permit mathematical accessibility. This drive for quantification
sometimes tempts the mathematician to ignore or reject complicating factors
that are nonetheless essential to the legal picture.
(footnote omitted).
80. Consider the problem in forecasting the inflation rate. The modeler must decide
whether a drop in the level of employment will decrease the inflation rate, whether a
drop in the inflation rate will lower the level of employment, or whether the two will
move independently based upon some third factor such as interest rates. The room for
error grows when the modeler not only risks making mistakes translating the phenomena
she wishes to capture into equations, but also cannot find a clear consensus about what
behavior she should model.
81. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
82. Fisher, supra note 8, at 714:
To proceed by first looking at the data and then including those factors that
appear correlated with the dependent variable is a recipe for spurious results. It
leads to a situation where no true test of the estimated relationship can be made.
In addition, it is likely to leave out variables that truly belong in and thus lead
to invalid as well as untested results ....
I mention this emphatically because a number of packaged computer pro-
grams that are sometimes used involve what is known as "step-wise regression."
Such programs build up multiple regression in ways similar to the following.
First, the program finds the independent variable and does a regression involv-
ing it. It then looks at the sample deviations from the regression (the differences
between the actual and predicted values) and asks whether those deviations are
correlated with another independent variable. If so, it puts in the variable most
correlated with those errors and so forth. This is not recommended. In the first
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For example, if the Federal Aviation Administration sought to
identify the causes of airplane crashes, it might study variables
such as weather, pilot fatigue, equipment malfunction, and in-
terference from other planes. Each of these explanatory vari-
ables will have some effect on crashes, and each factor will also
influence the other factors.83
If the modelers would simply include all of those variables,
they may "discover" a mathematical relationship between two of
the variables, even though the two variables are not related."'
The selection of an independent variable from a large group of
interdependent variables often yields what appears to be a
causal relationship even though no relationship exists between
the explanatory and dependent variables.8 5 To obtain accurate
results, the agency must first develop a theory based upon one
variable, such as pilot error, and then complete a regression
analysis to verify this hypothesis. Without an initial theory, an
place, even if none of the independent variables have anything to do with the
dependent variable, proceeding in this fashion is very likely to produce the ap-
pearance of a high correlation in a particular sample. Second, variables that in
fact belong in the relationship but that are correlated with the independent vari-
ables used early in the procedure tend never to get in. In general, such computer
programs suffer from the same problems as attempts to look by eye at bilateral
relationships that in fact involve the influence of many variables: they are likely
to attribute the effects of the omitted variables to the included ones and result
in biased estimates.
83. For example, bad weather will increase pilot fatigue, make equipment more prone
to malfunction, and make it more difficult to see other planes.
84. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 714.
85. Id. at 715, 735:
[I]t is important to realize that such building down cannot be done without an
antecedent theory .... Without some theory about which variables are likely to
matter, throwing a great number of variables into the hopper is likely to lead to
spurious results. If one tries enough combinations of variables, then, in a partic-
ular sample, one will tend to get some relationship that appears to fit well.
Therefore, a properly done study begins with a decent theoretical idea of what
variables are likely to be important. It then can proceed to test well-defined hy-
potheses about additional variables. But a study that casts about for a good-
looking relationship by trying all sorts of possibilities is very likely to come up
with relationships where none exist.
... While multiple regression and related econometric techniques are powerful
tools for analyzing data, their proper use presupposes an underlying theory of
the structure generating those data. While some hypotheses concerning that
structure can be tested with these tools, the theory itself cannot be discovered
by computer runs and data experimentation.
See also Henning & Mann, An Appraisal of Model Building in Industrial Organization,
3 RESEARCH IN L. & EcON. 1, 9 (1981): "To proceed empirically with regression analysis
when one cannot have absolute a priori confidence in one of the theories will generate
numerical values, no matter how sophisticated the econometric technique, which are
meaningless."
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agency could justify almost any policy choice.8 a As one professor
of economics warned, "[T]he measurement provided by least
squares regression is a way of making theoretical assumptions
precise or of testing them; it is not a substitute for thought. '8 7
A regression analysis used in a ratemaking proceeding illus-
trates the inherent dangers of using a computer to generate rela-
tionships randomly between variables.88 The expert, who had a
total of fifty possible explanatory variables to choose from, de-
veloped a theory and then, instead of using the variables to sub-
stantiate or disprove the theory, he merely developed a theory
around the seven variables that produced the best correlation. 9
His results showed explanatory variables that yielded statisti-
cally significant figures. Yet closer inspection showed that he
had allowed a type of statistical interference, the correlation ef-
fect, to affect the relationship between the explanatory and de-
pendent variables. This study had the aura of authority but did
not depict accurately the costs the agency had attempted to
model. It merely manipulated a mass of numbers into a statisti-
cal relationship; it failed to capture the behavior the modeler
wished to represent. In this case, the model was precise, meaning
that it produced statistically significant figures, but not accurate,
because it did not represent reality.
Indeed, the very precision of the results from the models may
make the public and the courts less likely to review their accu-
racy because of lawyers' respect for and fear of numbers. An
agency finding of fact produced on computer paper may not be
challenged as rigorously as one produced in any other medium.
Congress grants agencies the authority to make policy choices.
This grant of authority includes the right to study policy options
with tools such as computer models. But when agencies use
models to justify predetermined policy choices, the agency may
abuse this discretion. The public and the courts can keep the
agencies in check only by reviewing their actions. Review of ac-
tions involving the use of computer models requires disclosure.
86. See Henning & Mann, supra note 85 (demonstrating the possibility of taking
three relationships, X causes Y, Y causes X, and X and Y cause each other, and "prov-
ing" each relationship by a regression analysis). The "proof" of each relationship de-
pends upon the selection of the underlying theory necessary to explain the relationship.
87. Fisher, supra note 8, at 714.
88. See Finkelstein, supra note 8, at 1449 n.27 (discussing testimony regarding a re-
gression study introduced in Long Island Lighting Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 93 (N.Y.P.S.C.
1971)).
89. Finkelstein, supra note 8, at 1449 n.27.
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C. Data Problems
Obtaining empirical data for multivariate regression models
frustrates most modelers. Policymakers often cannot gather data
in controlled experiments because they cannot isolate every fac-
tor in a problem to permit measurement of one variable.90 The
advantage of computer models lies in their ability to digest large
volumes of data and make predictions. Yet this ability can also
become a disadvantage; any errors in the initial data will be
magnified in the results of the model. Courts will review data
errors in computer models."1 These data errors fall into six
categories.
Too little data will disrupt models. Statisticians label this the
"degrees of freedom" problem.9 2 The number of degrees of free-
dom of a statistic is the number of available observations minus
the number of constraints placed on the data by the calculation
procedure. When the number of observations is small relative to
the number of explanatory variables, modelers can make a sta-
tistically significant correlation, even though the variables are
not actually related. '3 This apparent correlation will often di-
minish or disappear if the modeler includes a larger body of
data.
Second, variables may be highly but not perfectly correlated
with each other. This is often termed the "multicolinearity prob-
lem."9 4 When the functions of two independent variables have a
close relationship, the modeler may believe a relationship exists
between the regression coefficients when there is none. This
90. Consider the difficulty in measuring and isolating the sources of air pollution. If
the EPA decided to impose stricter emission controls on new cars, it would have a diffi-
cult time determining the environmental effect of this decision because of the many dif-
ferent sources of pollution. Only a computer model can artificially hold all other sources
of pollution constant so that it can measure one source. Cf. DeLong, supra note 43, at
329: "[Flew [policy] choices are easily bounded. Most have side effects, and in many
cases these impacts, good or bad, outweigh the importance of the objective." DeLong
continues:
Most government choices involve "polycentric problems" in which it is impossi-
ble to affect just one variable in a complicated web of interconnecting relation-
ships. Because the government cannot restrict its effects to one area, analysis of
these side effects is extremely difficult, and often impossible, especially when
second, third, or nth order consequences are involved.
Id. at n.342 (citations omitted); see also Fisher, supra note 8, at 705.
91. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
92. See Intriligator, supra note 8, at 157.
93. See generally M. EZEKIEL & K. Fox, METHODS OF CORRELATION AND REGRESSION
ANALYSIS 300-05 (3d ed. 1967).
94. See Intriligator, supra note 8, at 157.
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problem will make it more difficult to estimate the regression
coefficients and to determine the extent of the relationship. In
addition, some of the other variables may correlate highly with
one or more of the included variables. Because multicolinearity
depends upon sample size, the modeler must obtain more data."
"Serial correlation"9 ' represents the third major problem fac-
ing those working with econometric models. This problem occurs
when the error terms from one observation carry over into other
observations. For example, in predicting vehicle usage for a road
expansion, an overestimate in one year may lead to overesti-
mates in succeeding years.
Fourth, a discontinuous change in the real world may cause
the data to refer to different populations or events. This "struc-
tural change problem '97 arises most frequently where the model-
ers do not recognize a major shift in the relationship between
variables. For example, the gasoline-buying habits of Americans
shifted dramatically after the 1973 oil shock. A gasoline con-
sumption model based upon pre-1972 data would not recognize
the effect of conservation measures on consumption. This prob-
lem occurs frequently when modelers do not use data from a suf-
ficiently long time span to provide meaningful results. For exam-
ple, it may take five or more years for an air pollution regulation
to improve the environment. If the EPA attempted to measure a
change in pollution with twelve samples over a one-year period,
it is possible that the measurements would show little change
even though the policy was working. Time-series data should
therefore span a sufficient time period to ensure accurate
predictions.
Fifth, statistical problems arise from the measurement of eco-
nomic variables. This "errors of measurement problem"9 8 can
take many forms, such as poor calibration of the instruments
used to collect the data or improper placing of the measuring
devices.9 9 One of the most prevalent measurement problems lies
in trying to use imprecise measurements to produce precise re-
sults. Computer models that produce exact numbers may give
the aura of authority when, in truth, such models lack preci-
sion. 00 For example, the EPA may decide to measure the level
95. See, e.g., R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, supra note 8, at 68.




100. An important distinction exists between a model's accuracy and its precision.
Any modeler can make a computer model precise, which means that it reports its find-
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of air pollution in a certain valley. If some of the agency's instru-
ments could only measure readings to two decimal places even
though the computer model could accept measurements with ten
or twenty significant figures, the agency could report its findings
accurately to only two decimal places. The measurement of the
data controls the model's accuracy.
The final data problem with econometric models lies in their
inability to handle extreme data points, called "outlier data."
Econometric models rely on "least squares" regression. This
analysis measures the distance of individual data points from
the mean, the plotted position of the average value. Because this
distance is squared, an extreme data point has a magnified effect
on the model. If an agency had to disclose the model's data, then
the opposing party could determine if the agency data suffered
from this problem by dropping one or more of the data points,
reestimating the least-squares regression line, and comparing it
with the original line. 10' If this new run yielded little change,
then the party challenging the model can assume that the outli-
ers did not disrupt the results.
Economists have developed a number of techniques to counter
these problems. Unfortunately, these techniques may disrupt
rather than explain the data. 02 None of these methods for sal-
vaging a model can create information; they can only analyze the
information the agency collected. Only models with viable theo-
ries and unbiased data can yield proper results for agencies.
Only agencies that release the assumptions, methodology, and
sources of data used to construct their models can give the pub-
lic and the courts the opportunity to make an adequate review
of agency decisions.
ings exactly, often to a number of decimal places. Yet agencies should only make deci-
sions from accurate models, meaning that the models capture the true behavior of the
system the agency wishes to study. Most computer models can more easily measure
trends than they can provide exact answers to inexact policy questions. The more precise
the agency makes the model, the more the lawyer should suspect that the agency model-
ers do not understand the limits of the model. Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,
332 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Such [computer] models ... are at best imperfect and subject to
manipulation as EPA forthrightly recognizes.") (footnote omitted); Flynn, The Misuse of
Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. L.J. 335, 358-60 (1981).
101. See R. PINDYCK & D. RutINFELD, supra note 8, at 68.
102. See Intriligator, supra note 8, at 157:
For example, replacing annual data by quarterly data increases the number of
data points but tends to aggravate both the multicolinearity and the serial corre-
lation problems; eliminating data points referring to unusual periods, such as
during war years, overcomes the structural change problems, but aggravates both
the degree of freedom and the multicolinearity problems; and replacing variables
by their first differences overcomes the serial correlation problem but aggravates
the errors of measurement problem.
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IV. METHODS OF VERIFYING THE RESULTS OF COMPUTER
MODELS USED BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Models can be verified in one of two ways. Agencies and the
public can run tests to ensure that the modelers followed proper
procedures in constructing these models. A successful comple-
tion of these tests will not prove that the agency produced the
correct results, but many models that fail these tests will not
make correct predictions. The second way to verify these models
is to examine the assumptions, model theory, and data used by
the agency.
A. Tests
One can often determine whether or not the modeler started
with a theory by examining the number of computer runs the
modeler used to produce a statistically significant relationship.
The higher the number of runs, particularly those involving
mindless mechanical work, the greater the chance that the mod-
eler used the computer to conform the model to the agency's
predetermined findings, rather than using the results from the
model to make the findings.
Parties reviewing models can also check them against other
models and historical trends. Verifying these relationships may
require the services of an expert. The best agency models and
rules will have already made these comparisons with the results
reported in the administrative record. 03 If the agency has not
done this, parties scrutinizing the model should determine
whether the model can describe known fact situations with ease
and precision. If a Department of Energy model predicts that a
nuclear power plant will lead to higher electric rates for custom-
ers ten years from now, the same model should be able to ana-
lyze past data to predict present electric rates. The modeler
should be able to examine data from ten years ago, use the as-
sumptions valid at that time, and then use the model to "prove"
that an operating nuclear plant that actually did cause higher
rates should have done so.
Experts should also "insult" the model. To do this, a modeler
makes one variable abnormally high or low, such as setting in-
103. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Citizens Against
the Refinery's Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1981); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1026 (4th Cir. 1981).
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terest rates at 150%. If the model cannot make a prediction with
this amount, the modeler may have unjustifiably restricted the
possible outcomes of the model by building biases into it."04
In extremely technical rulemakings, parties objecting to the
results of models may have the opportunity to cross-examine the
modeler. 106 To determine some of the possible errors in the
model a lawyer might ask, "What would a skilled modeler have
to do to disprove the model?" The modeler should know the
weaknesses of the model better than anyone else; this question
should allow those objecting to policy choices based upon com-
puter models to isolate the model's weak points quickly and
efficiently.
The use of these tests will help those objecting to agency fact-
findings determine whether the agency abused its discretion. Be-
cause of the complexity and interactive character of most com-
puter models, though, tests run after the completion of the mod-
104. For an example of an artificially constricted model, see Southern La. Rate Cases
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 428 F.2d 407, 436 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
See also supra notes 27, 77-78 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (allowing cross-examination where "the general policy questions became inter-
fused with relatively specific technical issues"); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin. 449 F.2d
1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("fairness may require an opportunity for cross-examination
on the crucial issues"). A party, however, must generally show that its interests would be
prejudiced without cross-examination. See National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train,
539 F.2d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n,
498 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1974); O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Virgin Islands Hotel Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 476 F.2d 1263, 1267-
69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973). Cf. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v.
EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1160 (6th Cir. 1978). In this case, the court did not require cross-
examination of the administrator in the use of an air quality simulation model, but it did
note:
While we believe that cross-examination of an administrative agency's experts is
not a required or normal part of informal rulemaking under section 553, we do
not exclude the possibility that a case may be presented to this court wherein
remand for cross-examination about disputed facts will prove both logical and
necessary.
Id.
Note that all of these cases were decided before the 1978 case of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, which struck
down a large portion of the court-developed law of rulemaking procedure developed dur-
ing the 1970's, According to Professor Davis, the decision did not reach the question of
whether "'elementary fairness' sometimes requires opportunity for a rule making party
to cross-examine with respect to identified issues of specific fact, at least in some circum-
stances, even though [the APA] § 553 imposes no such requirement .... " 1 K. DAVIS,
supra note 34, § 6:36, at 610. The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on this or
whether or not cross-examination is allowed in administrative proceedings absent spe-
cific statutory authorization. No court has established a claim of right to cross-examina-
tion in administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 54 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
Computer Models
els can uncover only some of the problems. The real opportunity
to examine the usefulness of agency predictions comes not from
examining the outcome of the model but from examining the
process and methods used to construct the model.
B. Proposed Regulation: Requirements for the Disclosure of
Information Used To Create Computer Models
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND POLICY
Federal Administrative Agencies and parties ap-
pearing before regulatory bodies frequently rely upon
computer-generated simulations to formulate or at-
tack policy. The results from many of these computer
models can be replicated only by making another com-
puter-based study. To ensure that the agencies make
the proper decisions and that the public and the courts
have the opportunity to review these decisions, all par-
ties to a decision shall have an opportunity to review
the assumptions, methodology, and data used in the
completion of these models.
SECTION I: DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Act, the following words and
phrases shall, unless the context clearly indicates oth-
erwise, have the following meanings:
(a) "Administrative Agencies" means
(1) all Federal agencies;
(2) all Federal regulatory bodies; and
(3) any groups or organizations exercis-
ing Federal administrative authority
granted by Congress.
(b) "Analysis" means all reports submitted to
Administrative Agencies that include any
statistical, mathematical, or computer
analysis.
(c) "Assumptions" means the facts and judg-
ments that go into the construction or com-
pletion of the study or analysis.
(d) "Computer model" means any computer-
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generated simulation.
(e) "Data collection" means all statistical in-
formation used to complete an analysis.
(f) "Methodology" means the theory or ration-
ale used to construct the model.
(g) "Operating manuals" means the documen-
tation used to run any software or hard-
ware needed to complete the study or
analysis.
(h) "Parties" includes Administrative Agencies,
and members of the public, organizations,
or government units that appear before Ad-
ministrative Agencies.
(i) "Policy choices" means all decisions made
by Administrative Agencies affecting any
member of the public, organizations, or
government units.
(j) "Programs" means any software needed to
complete the study or analysis.
(k) "Study plan" means the theory upon which
the model is based and includes a summary
of all material used to develop the theory.
SECTION II: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
All studies and analyses used to formulate policy
choices or offered as evidence or support in hearing
proceedings or relied upon in support of other evidence
shall include:
(a) a clear statement of the assumptions and
methodology employed;
(b) a description of the data collection tech-
niques, estimation, and testing used in the
completion of the study or analysis; and
(c) a clear statement of the alternative sources
of action considered.
SECTION III: ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND OTHER
COMPUTER MODELS
All econometric and other computer models shall in-
clude a complete description of the model, including the
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assumptions, methodology, and statistical specifica-
tions used in the construction of the model, and a clear
statement of the effects on the final results of altera-
tions of the assumptions.
SECTION IV: ACCESS TO MODELS
All econometric and other models completed by com-
puter shall include provisions guaranteeing access to
the data bases, operating manuals, and programs used
in the formulation of the model. The parties shall pro-
vide this information either by releasing it in machine-
readable form, or by providing access to a time-shar-
ing system. The parties providing this information may
charge a reasonable amount for its use. This provision
shall not be construed to require the release of infor-
mation protected under provisions of the Freedom of
Information Act.
SECTION V: ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Upon request, a party that relies upon a model shall
also submit to the requesting party any alternative
studies, including those employing alternative models
or variables, that were completed. The party shall also
supply a description of any alternative studies contem-
plated but never completed, as well as the reasons for
noncompletion.
SECTION VI: DATA
The parties shall provide the formulas used for any
statistical estimates, the standard errors for each com-
ponent estimated, the test statistics and a description
of the statistical tests, and all related computations
and final results.
The parties shall provide summary requests of all in-
put data and, upon request, the actual input data. The
party holding the data may charge a reasonable
amount to cover the costs of transferring the data.
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These costs may include the cost of transmission and
technician's time used to complete the transfer.
CONCLUSION
Many federal agencies and parties appearing before regulatory
bodies use computer models for policy formulation. The use of
well-documented models simplifies review procedures because
the public can examine the assumptions and information that
administrators used to ensure that the agency did not abuse its
discretion.
Currently, there are no comprehensive requirements detailing
what information agencies must release when they make deci-
sions based upon computer-generated simulations. This infor-
mation includes the assumptions, methodology, and data used to
construct the model. The disclosure of this information would
improve the policy process by providing the public and the
courts with greater insight into the rationale and justification for
administrative agency decisions.
-John P. Barker
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